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Executive Summary 
Since independence in the Pacific, the performance of oversight agencies has been mixed.  
This paper examines the performance of these oversight agencies, focusing on their 
strengths and impediments.  It examines possible ways that oversight can be strengthened 
in the Pacific. 
One major finding of this research is that oversight agencies can not be examined in 
isolation.  They must be conceptualised relationally within the law and justice sector as a 
total package of regulatory institutions.  Oversight agencies, with the possible exemption 
of parliamentary committees (which have a political autonomy), share important linkages 
with each other and the judiciary, Attorneys General offices, departments of public 
prosecution, the police and affiliated statutory bodies such as leadership, electoral and 
human rights commissions. 
While this paper is concerned with the oversight capacities of the entire law and justice 
sector it will focus on: 
? Ombudsmen.  
? Auditors General.  
? The Parliamentary committee system. 
? Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).  These relatively new institutions oversee a  
different but complementary suite of risks, namely money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  They oversee private as well as public sector activities.  In providing 
tools to monitor flows of funds, FIUs can assist oversight agencies in their 
supervision of public expenditure and the control of corruption. 
   
This paper is concerned with all member states of the Pacific Islands Forum, except 
Australia and New Zealand. There is a distinction between countries that have 
constitutional provisions for extensive oversight functions – namely Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji – and other member states where specific oversight 
agencies either do not exist or have developed as part of the regulatory machinery of 
administrative practice (this is most applicable to Ombudsmen offices).     
In summary this research has found that: 
1) Oversight performance is undermined by political interference. 
2) The linkages within and between oversight institutions and other agencies within 
the law and justice sector and the rest of the administration is weak.   
3) There is debate about the reasons for the weak links between oversight and 
enforcement branches within the law and justice sector.   
4) Political will is crucial for the effective performance of oversight agencies.  
5) Oversight agencies do not exercise their powers and capacities to their full 
potential.  
6) Oversight institutions require budgetary independence to perform effectively.  
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7) The designated responsibilities, roles and functions of oversight institutions are 
often unclear, ill-defined or broad.   
8) The capacities of oversight agencies are impeded by antiquated legislation.   
9) Leadership codes or codes of conduct for leaders have been developed as a way of 
addressing shortfalls in legislation.   
10) Regional support bodies are being encouraged to enhance and institutionally 
strengthen the capacities of national oversight agencies.   
11) Leadership and the presence of champions for good governance within oversight 
agencies is crucial to their performance.   
12) Education and outreach is an important part of performance for oversight 
institutions.   
13) Oversight institutions perform most effectively when there is public demand for 
good governance and state accountability.   
This paper argues that oversight institutions could be institutionally strengthened by 
developing and applying models of responsive regulation and reinforcing these models 
with concrete policy innovations. 
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Introduction 
Oversight agencies are meta regulatory authorities.1  They monitor and regulate the 
behaviour of wider regulatory bodies comprising the machinery of government and 
administration.  The legitimacy and capacity of governments, parliaments, executives and 
public services is dependent on their ability to discharge their duties in a responsible and 
accountable fashion that assumes a fair degree of self-regulation.  Oversight institutions 
such as Ombudsman, Auditors General, and Parliamentary committees have been 
established over time to monitor and evaluate the self-regulation exercised by 
governments and public bodies.   
Oversight agencies are particularly concerned with accountable, equitable and transparent 
public financing and expenditure.  The scope oversight institutions exercise also includes 
scrutiny of conflicts of interest among leaders and public officials, electoral supervision, 
state sector performance, the delivery of public goods and services (such as health, 
education and infrastructure) and human rights.  Oversight institutions are vital in 
maintaining accountability, responsibility, probity, transparency and equitability in 
government and administration.  This assumes that oversight agencies are themselves 
accountable, responsible, transparent and equitable in discharging their meta-regulatory 
duties.  It also assumes that they function efficiently and effectively, are well resourced, 
are free from political interference and have budgetary autonomy.  If oversight agencies 
themselves are unable to perform effectively, due to internal or external factors (or a 
mixture of both) then their capacity to regulate the wider functions of government and 
administration can be severely curtailed.  
This paper examines the regulatory performance and capacities of Ombudsmen, Auditors 
General, Parliamentary committee systems and FIUs in member states of the Pacific 
Islands Forum.  With independence, countries in the Pacific inherited or established 
oversight systems of governance.  These are primarily designed to oversee public sector 
expenditure and the use of public resources.  Their roles have been progressively widened 
over the past 20 years to include oversight of ethical behaviour of public officials, the 
conduct of leaders, electoral administration, public sector service delivery and human 
rights.  This paper is primarily concerned with oversight of public financing and 
expenditure and considers other regulatory areas where they affect the management of 
state funds (for example corruption and conflicts of interest involving leaders and 
officials).   
The success that these agencies have had in overseeing the responsibilities and duties 
discharged by national governments and administrations has varied.  In some cases the 
oversight agency performs well internally, but because of financial, political or 
administrative arrangements is unable to effectively make or enforce findings and 
recommendations.  In other cases, the oversight agency itself faces internal administrative 
and organisational problems that limit its capacity to effectively oversee broader 
government activities, even where there is support and cooperation from the institutions it 
                                                 
1 Meta regulation refers to the “risk management of risk management” (Braithwaite, 2003: 1).  It involves 
establishing regulatory networks whereby oversight agencies can monitor and enforce self-regulation by 
the institutions that they oversee.   
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is mandated with regulating.  Both internal and external factors frame oversight 
performance.  These include linkages and relationships within the law and justice sector 
(and across the machinery of government and administration), resources, management, 
leadership, skills and experience, funding and finance, statutory autonomy, political 
interference, interference from the private sector and antiquated legislation.   
Consequently oversight agencies in the Pacific are reported not to operate to their fullest 
potential.  They do not exercise the full range of powers available to their office holders.  
This may not necessary be a problem per se.  Responsive regulation (which can be 
defined here as a mixture of command and control and self regulation/cooperative 
regulation, combining ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’) suggests that regulators should focus 
their efforts on education, persuasion and cooperation with the institutions that they 
oversee.  What is important is that they do have the full range of capacities to escalate 
sanctions and enforcement in cases of non-compliance.  This paper will examine the 
enabling and constraining factors to responsive regulation as exercised by oversight 
institutions in the Pacific.  It suggests that more active strategies of responsive regulation 
combining structural and behavioural factors with specific organisational and 
administrative changes, championing leadership, specific legal reforms and 
regionalisation could institutionally strengthen Ombudsmen, Auditors General, 
Parliamentary committees and FIUs in the Pacific. 
Oversight institutions in the Pacific: a review  
Oversight institutions are a vital component to ‘national integrity systems’ providing 
important checks and balances over the powers of governments, administrations and 
executives (Larmour & Barcham, 2004: 5).2  While their oversight contributes to 
maintaining the integrity of the organisations they regulate, they also need to ensure their 
own integrity.  In the Pacific, efficacy in overseeing external government and 
administrative bodies as well as maintaining their own internal accountability varies 
throughout the region.  All Pacific Island States have Auditors General.  Of the 16 
members of the Pacific Islands Forum, 10 have ombudsmen (Larmour & Barcham, 2004: 
24).  There is even more variation in Parliamentary committees throughout the region. 
The PNG parliament for example has 38 committees that scrutinise legislation, Fiji has a 
total of 12 committees and Vanuatu has three standing committees (Morgan, 2005: 18).  
Public accounts committees charged with oversight of expenditure are an important part 
of the Parliamentary committee system.  Yet they are not always parliamentary 
committees.  In Samoa for example, this is a public service, not a Parliamentary, 
committee.   
There are variations in the constitutional and administrative arrangements for oversight 
institutions that influence their capacities.  For example, in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu 
and the Solomon Islands the Ombudsman’s office is incorporated into the constitution 
                                                 
2 National Integrity systems is a term devised by Transparency International to refer to “the sum total of the 
laws, institutions and practices within a given country that address maintaining honesty and integrity of 
government and private sector institutions” (http://apseg.anu.edu.au/nispac/default.php).  It consists of 11 
inter-dependent pillars (the legislative, executive, judiciary, auditor-general, ombudsman, watchdog 
agencies, public service, media, civil society, private sector and international actors) (for further details see 
Pope, 2000: 35).   
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and is mandated with regulating leadership code legislation.  In countries where 
ombudsmen have been established by legislation rather than provided for by the 
constitution and there is no designated leadership oversight (over and above the 
Ombudsman’s function of receiving and reporting on complaints about government 
conduct) their roles are considered relatively ineffectual.  In the Cook Islands for 
example, the Ombudsman is appointed by the Queens Representative on recommendation 
of the Prime Minister under the terms of the Ombudsman Act of 1984.  Appointments to 
the Ombudsman’s office do not need to be made on merit, there is no anonymity for 
complaints and it is not perceived to be an impartial body.  A public opinion survey of 
people’s views of the Ombudsman in the Cook Islands released in 1998 found that 92 per 
cent were dissatisfied with the office (Ingram & Uhrle, 2004: 20).   
Not all oversight institutions are required to make their reports public.  In Samoa and the 
Cook Islands there is no requirement to make reports public.  In Tonga annual reports are 
submitted to parliament and made public by this route.  In the Solomon Islands, reports 
are made available only to the parties concerned and while an annual report is tabled in 
parliament it receives little consideration.  In Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu 
ombudsman reports are published and made publicly available.  Both ombudsman offices 
have considered this an important part of their educative responsibilities to the 
community, though the number of reports released in Vanuatu has declined significantly 
in the past five years.   
Auditors General are crucial in providing management and information on the way public 
funds are uplifted, expended and acquitted.  In the Pacific, Auditors General are 
appointed by or report to the executive, the legislative or both (Larmour & Barcham, 
2004).  Only Niue does not have an Auditor General, with the Audit Office of New 
Zealand providing auditing services to the government (Talagi, 2004: 13).   In some 
countries, while there is a statutory office of Auditory General there has been a trend to 
sub-contract auditing services to the private sector.  In the Marshall Islands, state owned 
enterprises have had their accounts audited by the US firm Deloitte and Touche (Pollock, 
2004: 49).   
While Auditors General have a crucial role in monitoring and supervising government 
accounts, funds are susceptible to mismanagement where they are not readily recorded in 
financial management systems.  Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) can assist in 
supervising financial transactions through monitoring, assessing and analysing suspicious 
flows of funds.  This is done at both a national and international level.  Most Pacific 
countries have introduced or are in the process of introducing Financial Transaction 
Reporting (FTR) legislation which is enforced through the establishment of FIUs.  These 
require the private sector to report suspicious cash transactions based on proscribed 
thresholds of funds or in any event where suspicion is aroused.  They also allow 
transnational financial movements to be effectively monitored.  This is particularly 
relevant in countries that maintain active offshore finance centres, such as Vanuatu, 
Samoa and the Cook Islands.  
In 1998 the OECD calculated that the amount of money flowing from G7 countries into 
Caribbean and Pacific Island states increased five fold between 1985 and 1995 to more 
than US$200 billion per annum, far exceeding total outward bound Foreign Direct 
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Investment (FDI) in these two regions (OECD, 1998: 17).  The OECD contended that 
these funds are not used for conventional investment purposes, but rather being diverted 
to Caribbean and Pacific Offshore Finance Centres.  The recent move to establish FIUs in 
the Pacific allows such financial movements to be more effectively scrutinised.  They 
could conceivably provide an important new source of information on the disbursement 
of funds by governments and administrations, particularly in cases of misuse, fraud and 
corruption.  They thus provide an important domestic, as well as international, oversight 
tool.   
Understanding the similarities and variations in the way oversight institutions operate in 
the Pacific provides important insights into their capacities and efficacy.  For example, if 
an Auditor General is appointed by the Prime Minister and is not required to report to 
parliament then accountability in both offices is comprised.  However, if an Auditor 
General is mandated in the constitution and is appointed by an independent and 
transparent committee, has budgetary independence that is not beholden to any one 
political faction and is required to report to the legislature who makes the office’s 
findings public, then the accountability of all agencies involved in the auditing process is 
enhanced.  A similar case could be made for Ombudsman offices and arrangements for 
appointing Parliamentary committees.  Appointment processes, budgetary independence, 
reporting requirements and constitutional and legal mandates vary tremendously in the 
Pacific.  Variations in oversight institutions affect inter-agency cooperation, resourcing, 
enforcement, political interference, leadership, management and performance, exposing 
their differences even further.  However, they also suggest practical ways that oversight 
agencies could be institutionally strengthened.      
Internal and external levers of oversight accountability 
Internal (the oversight agency) and external (institutions that are overseen) levers of 
oversight accountability are both structural and behavioural.   The right structural and 
behavioural mix is required in and between both regulating and regulated institutions in 
order to achieve optimal performance.  In the Pacific this structural and behavioural 
balance is unevenly distributed.  In some cases oversight agencies perform well with 
limited resources, but their performance is undermined by external pressures and 
constraints.  It is external individuals and agencies who work against the oversight 
institutions. Alternatively, the oversight institutions themselves may be ineffectual due to 
resourcing deficiencies, lack of effective leadership, management constraints, unclear 
roles and responsibilities and low staff morale.  External and internal pressures can 
operate in tandem so that even if an oversight institution started out performing well, it 
ends up as an internally moribund organisation.   
After 15 years of independence the Vanuatu government gave effect to articles 61-65 of 
the constitution and passed the Ombudsman Act of 1995 (Hill, 2001).  Marie-Noelle 
Ferrieux Patterson was appointed first Ombudsman.  The Ombudsman commenced work 
immediately and between 1996 and 2000 published almost 80 reports (Hill, 2001: 13).  
These were controversial reports, implicating Vanuatu politicians, officials and alleged 
foreign ‘investors’ in the misuse of power, corruption, fraud, nepotism and repeated 
violations of the leadership code (Crossland, 2000).  In one case involving the “cyclone 
Betsy relief fund”, the Ombudsman’s Office demonstrated that the then Prime Minister 
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Maxime Carlot Korman had transferred US$1.1 million set aside for cyclone relief into 
his own personal bank accounts, including those held offshore in Singapore and Malaysia 
(Republic of Vanuatu Ombudsman’s Office, 1996).  The Ombudsman made a number of 
recommendations, including that the case should be referred to the police and or the 
public prosecutor and funds be forfeited to the state.  None of these recommendations 
were followed through.   
The Vanuatu Ombudsman’s office faced sustained external pressure from parties named 
in complaints to frustrate investigations.  For example parties under investigation made 
attempts in the Supreme Court to block publication of reports (Crossland, 2000: 9-10).  
These were unsuccessful but did delay release, in one case by six months, by which time 
public controversy had subsided.  There were threats and intimidations against the office, 
but with independent funding from the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Vanuatu 
government (whose members and the affiliated administrative machinery of state were 
the main subjects of  investigations, reports and recommendations) was limited in the 
amount of financial pressure it could exert on the office.  However, in 1998 the Vanuatu 
state exercised the ultimate form of pressure against the Ombudsman.  It repealed the 
Ombudsman’s Act (1995).  
Ombudsman Patterson however, continued to operate on the grounds that the 
Constitution provided for that capacity.  This was short-lived.  In 1998 the Vanuatu 
government passed a new act.  This introduced a number of changes to the 1995 act.  
Staff employment was regulated by the Public Service, eliminating their independence 
that the 1995 legislation had enshrined (Hill, 2001: 7).  Allegations of criminal 
misconduct could not be made without asserting the offence and providing supporting 
evidence.  The new act removed the minimal enforcement powers the Ombudsman 
originally had.  A new Ombudsman was appointed in 1999.  Since 2000 the number of 
reports has declined substantially.  The Ombudsman’s reports must also be given to the 
public prosecutor and when uncovering allegations of criminal misconduct, must also be 
lodged with the Commissioner of Police (Newton Cain & Jowitt, 2004: 23).  To date 
there have been no prosecutions as a result of this new act.  
In the case of the Vanuatu Ombudsman, the office started out with an active program of 
hearing complaints, investigating them and releasing reports and recommendations.  
Political leaders and public officials were routinely exposed for malpractice. 
Consequently these same political leaders quickly began to exert pressure on the 
Ombudsman’s office, beginning with threats and intimidation and moving to court action 
challenging the ability of the office to release findings.  Then the Ombudsman’s act itself 
was repealed.  When the Ombudsman refused to vacate the post, a new law was passed 
finally removing the office holder who had so publicly rebuked and exposed the 
malpractices of the leadership.  The law itself was altered in an exercise of external 
pressure on the Ombudsman’s independence.   
A similar chain of events was evident in the removal of the Controller and Chief Auditor 
(Auditor General) of Samoa, Su’a Rimoni Ah Chong in 1995.  In 1994 the Chief Auditor 
issued a report to parliament exposing financial irregularities and short comings 
involving government departments and statutory bodies (So’o, Sinclair, Va’a and 
Lāmeta, 2004).  A report commissioned by Transparency International stated that: 
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Su’a cited numerous examples of corruption within government departments 
and among public servants and politicians.  Abuses cited include fraud, 
collusion, conflicts of interest and use of government land, equipment and 
staff for private enterprise.  At least seven cabinet ministers, or half of the 
total cabinet, were involved in corrupt practices according to the CCA (So’o, 
Sinclair, Va’a and Lāmeta, 2004: 18).   
The Chief Auditor’s report was subsequently dismissed by those implicated and Su’a was 
sacked.  There was no follow-up of criminal misconduct by either the Public Prosecutor 
or the Police.  Instead the government amended the constitution in 1997 stripping the 
office of Controller and Chief Auditor of its independence.   
The cases of the Controller and Chief Auditor in Samoa and the Ombudsman in Vanuatu 
are emblematic of many of the problems of political interference that confront oversight 
institutions in the Pacific.  There is a clear progression: an agency works effectively 
through efficiently managing its human and physical resources, it investigates, uncovers 
and releases evidence of malpractice by leaders and officials. These leaders and officials 
respond by exerting political pressure on and interfering with  the oversight agency, this 
pressure is escalated, and budgetary support is tampered with.  Ultimately the heads of 
oversight agencies are themselves dismissed and laws and constitutions are changed to 
justify the actions of those undermining the agency.  The oversight agency rapidly 
declines as a source of accountability, loses its independence and is rendered largely 
ineffective.  Thus the following trends in oversight performance emerge: 
1) Oversight performance is undermined by political interference 
 
 This is primarily exerted by members of the executive and legislative branches of 
government and partisan appointees in senior levels of the public service.  Pressure is 
also exerted, either directly or indirectly, from private sector interests who are implicated 
in public wrong doing.3  This political interference can take the form of threats, 
intimidation and dismissals.  Funding can be reduced or even terminated.  Legislative 
changes can be enacted that strip oversight agencies of many of their powers, functions 
and capacities.  The Ombudsman in Vanuatu and the Controller and Chief Auditor in 
Samoa, for example, faced all these forms of political interference, cumulating in 
legislative changes reducing the powers of both offices.   
2) The linkages within and between oversight institutions and other agencies 
within the law and justice sector and the rest of the administration are weak. 
 
                                                 
3 There is a relationship between public corruption and the behavior of the private sector.  Both operate in 
tandem.  It was reported in discussions with interlocutors for this research that “government officials 
become corrupt because they have access to the private sector” (interlocutor communication with author).  
Analyses of corruption, wrong doing and misuse in the Pacific have focused on public sector corruption.  
However, practices (such as offering or granting bribes, kickbacks and facilitating conflicts of interest) of 
the private sector in what is in effect a symbiotic relationship also need further investigation, research and 
oversight scrutiny.   
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Where oversight agencies undertake investigations, release their findings (either publicly 
or through official channels) and make recommendations, the latter are not followed 
through by governments and/or administrations.  In cases of alleged criminal misconduct 
by political leaders and public officials uncovered by offices of Auditors General, 
Ombudsmen and Parliamentary committees this is not always taken any further by the 
enforcement branches of the law and justice sector, namely police and Departments of 
Public Prosecution (DPP).  This is seen in the cases of the Vanuatu Ombudsman and the 
Chief Auditor in Samoa.  In Vanuatu, Ombudsman’s reports were sent to the police and 
the DDP but there was no further follow-up action.  For example in the  Cyclone Betsy 
account case the Ombudsman’s first recommendation was that 
[T]he public prosecutor and or the police should investigate the payments 
made by Mr Korman presented to the bank in the period around the November 
1995 elections with the view to charging him with bribery and possibly other 
offences under the penal code [cap 135] (Republic of Vanuatu, Ombudsman’s 
Office, 1996).   
This was never done.  In another report entitled Delays in Police Investigations, the 
Vanuatu Ombudsman found that there was widespread police inaction in cases involving 
misappropriation of funds and government resources (Republic of Vanuatu, 
Ombudsman’s Office, 1998).  While evidence was presented to police, the latter took no 
further action, or delayed taking action by up to three years.   
Similar reports suggesting a weak link in the chain of command and action between 
oversight and enforcement are widespread throughout the Pacific.  For example in the 
Solomon Islands, the Auditor General’s office has found evidence of “massive 
corruption”.  The police must now investigate, but they “are yet to follow” (interlocutor 
communication with author).  Whereas the Auditor General believes that there is 
sufficient evidence with which to launch a prosecution, the police feel that it is 
inadequate.  Consequently, the public are seeing that the people involved in the 
corruption are not being investigated.  “Reports come out and nothing is done” 
(interlocutor communication with author).   
There are a number of structural and behavioural reasons cited for these sub-optimal links 
between oversight and enforcement branches within the law and justice sector.  These 
intersect and expand on the two trends discussed above. They include: 
3) There is debate about the reasons for the weak links between the oversight and 
enforcement branches within the law and justice sector 
 A first view suggests that agencies lack sufficient resources, skills and expertise to 
follow through on recommendations made by oversight agencies.  In cases of alleged 
criminal misconduct, the police may lack adequate human resources (skills, training and 
capacity) to prosecute financial crime (for example, investigators with financial or 
accountancy skills).  One of the reasons cited for the lack of enforcement follow up of 
oversight recommendations was the lack of investigative skills, capacity and experience 
in financial and fraud areas.  Many police forces lack basic equipment such as computers, 
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toner for photocopiers, files and stationary.  It is not always the case that resources are 
not available, but rather that they are not suitable for the environments that they are used 
in.  For example, photocopiers periodically break down given the humid vagaries of 
Pacific climates and there is no support to fix malfunctioning equipment.  It is difficult to 
pursue a case when basic equipment necessary for further investigation is unavailable.  In 
Kiribati for example, there are no commercial photographic processing labs, so police 
photographs have to be sent to Fiji for processing causing delays in case management.  
This view emphasises that oversight agencies lack sufficient levels of resources to 
perform their tasks effectively.  Oversight performance could be improved through 
increased levels of funding and resources.    
A second position suggests that oversight agencies have had more than adequate 
resources made available to them by both national governments and foreign donors.  In 
fact foreign resources have poured aid into oversight agencies in the last thirty years.  It is 
not so much the level of resources, but better management of existing resources that 
would improve performance.  It is accurate for example to observe that Parliamentary 
Public Accounts Committees in the region tend to be understaffed and underfunded.  
However, a lot of MPs do not use the resources they have available to  them.  It was 
reported that only one MP in Vanuatu actually used the Parliamentary library on a regular 
basis, “used the internet” for research and carefully studied legislation before it was 
passed.  Most MPs do not concern themselves with the legislative details, even where the 
infrastructure is available.  Many committees are formed but do not actually operate, 
while their members continue to draw sitting allowances (Morgan, 2005).  
The mismanagement of resources is often due to the way managerial operating systems 
are configured.  The loss, damage or disappearance of equipment can sometimes be due 
to a combination of external climatic factors, lack of awareness or negligence.  It is not 
always a case of criminal intent.  Resources need to be sustainable and feasible.  It is 
important to get the right mix of environment, technology, training and resources.   
4) Political will is crucial for the effective performance of oversight agencies 
With some exceptions then, the poor linkages between the oversight and enforcement 
branches of the law and justice sector are explained by either inadequate resourcing 
(funding, equipment, skills, training and experience)  or the resources available to them 
are inefficiently managed or both.   There is another position which minimises both the 
resource allocation and management question.  It emphasises political will as crucial for 
the effective performance of oversight agencies, regardless of the level of resourcing or 
how those resources are managed. This returns to the theme of the involvement of 
external parties in oversight agencies (for example, the effects of political pressure). If 
there is external political support for their work then this can facilitate performance even 
if resources are modest or minimal.   
For example, FIUs have recently been established in the Cook Islands and Fiji. Both are 
modestly resourced with two to three full time staff each.  The Cook Islands had been 
blacklisted as a Non Cooperative Country and Territory (NCCT) by the Paris based 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2000. The political leadership in the Cook Islands 
was determined to be removed from this list by establishing an effective financial 
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transaction oversight institution.  The government established an FIU and implemented 
sound Anti Money Laundering (AML) and Control of Terrorist Financing (CTF) 
measures.  In February 2005 the Cook Islands was removed from the FATF’s list of 
NCCTs.  In Fiji, key officials in the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the 
police started to meet to discuss money laundering risks and the need for a financial 
intelligence unit in 1997. They became champions of this  anti-money laundering drive 
within government, recruiting other key actors within the public sector.  These informal 
contacts lead to the passage of an FTR Act and the establishment of an FIU in 2003.  
Despite minimal resources and the lack of a separate budget line4, Fiji does have a fully 
functioning FIU that reports suspicious transactions and collects and disseminates 
financial intelligence to  other government agencies and neighbouring countries.   
These cases in the Cook Islands and Fiji illustrate that a lot can be done even with 
minimal resources if the political will is there.  The Vanuatu Ombudsman also operated 
with relatively few resources during the height of its investigations in the mid 1990s, but 
political will and support was absent (and in fact there was active political opposition to 
the Ombudsman) and the office in that format was eventually legislated out of existence.  
The Vanuatu Ombudsman’s performance in the mid to late 1990s is possibly an example 
of performance being “too good”.  The office functioned to the fullest extent of its 
powers, only to find that was more extensive than advisable, bringing about their 
curtailment.  This leads to oversight agencies engaging in forms of “self-censorship”.  In 
the absence of political will and support they do not exercise powers to their full potential 
in order to maintain their viability.   
5) Oversight agencies do not exercise powers to their full potential 
Some oversight institutions theoretically have extensive powers in the Pacific.  For 
example, the PNG Ombudsman Commission supervises the leadership code.  If there is 
evidence of breaches of the leadership code, then the Ombudsman’s Commission passes 
this on to the Public Prosecutor.  The Public Prosecutor then requests that the Chief 
Justice appoints a Leadership Tribunal composed of senior judges and magistrates to hear 
allegations of misconduct.  The tribunal can impose sanctions such as dismissal from 
parliament and levy fines.  The key link in this chain of command is the Public 
Prosecutor’s office.  If the Prosecutor does not act on a report from the Ombudsman’s 
office however, then the Ombudsman can prosecute leaders directly (Mellam and Aloi, 
2003: 32).  Yet such powers, where oversight agencies do exercise them in the Pacific, 
are only exerted infrequently.  PNG is probably the most successful example of an 
Ombudsman’s office in the Pacific, but even here it was reported that the Commission 
does not operate to the full extent of its capacity.  There is the possibility that if oversight 
institutions are “too successful” as in Vanuatu and Samoa in the early to mid 1990s then 
they would be vulnerable to even more political pressure, placing their long-term survival 
as effective upholders of accountability in doubt.  This is not necessarily as damaging as 
it may appear.  In fact the careful exercise of the powers that oversight agencies do have 
available to them has important implications for models of responsive regulation which 
will be discussed in the concluding parts of this paper.   
                                                 
4 The FIU is funded as part of the Reserve Bank of Fiji.   
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6) Oversight institutions require budgetary independence to perform effectively  
The provision of designated budget lines allocated by independent authorities assists 
oversight institutions in performing effectively.  When the Vanuatu Ombudsman was 
actively initiating investigations in the mid 1990s the office had budgetary independence 
and was funded directly by external donors (as was often pointed out by the office’s 
critics).  The absence of budgetary independence makes oversight institutions susceptible 
to external financial pressure.  If they are making findings that are critical of leadership, 
government and public administration, then their opponents in those areas can disable 
them by reducing budgetary support.  For many years this occurred in the Solomon 
Islands.  In a 2004 study of national integrity systems in the Solomon Islands 
Transparency International reported that: 
Although the Auditor General’s office is protected constitutionally and 
positioned so as to provide valuable checks and reporting to the public finance 
process, the office has been effectively prevented from fulfilling those 
functions.  Under-resourcing has been systematic and taken the form of denial 
of necessary trained personnel for the effective execution of the office’s role, 
and of necessary equipment and facilities.  The Auditor General at the time of 
the study had telephone access only through a public pay-phone, and a 
professional staff of one.  This is in contrast to a professional staff in 1979, of 
23 auditors and accountants.  The extent of under-resourcing is such  that 
annual reporting and the financial audits cannot achieve meaningful coverage 
in either breadth or depth (Roughan, 2004: 19).   
This situation has only been reversed with the increased support provided as part of the 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).  The situation in the 
Solomon Islands up until the arrival of RAMSI illustrates the importance of budgetary 
independence (and the enforcement of that independence where it is specified either in 
law or in the constitution).   
This raises important questions of how oversight heads are appointed and who appoints 
them.  Different degrees of independence are conferred on oversight agencies if their 
heads are appointed by the executive, the legislative or autonomous committees 
mandated constitutionally.  The independence of appointment complements an agency’s 
fiscal independence.  In PNG the Ombudsman is selected by an Ombudsman 
Appointment Committee comprising the Prime Minister as Chair, the leader of the 
Opposition, the Chief Justice, the Chairman of the Public Service Committee and the 
Chairman of the relevant permanent parliamentary committee (Mellam & Aloi, 2003: 30-
31).  Although funding is allocated from the national budget, and resourcing has reported 
to have been inadequate, there is a general sense of financial autonomy for the office.  
What is important here is the number of people involved in appointing the Ombudsman.  
The more people there are involved in making appointments and allocating budgets the 
greater the accountability.  Accountability is enhanced through widening the number and 
backgrounds of people and parties involved in supervising the mechanisms of 
accountability.  Accountability is reduced if only one or two people in government or the 
public service are responsible for making appointments and allocating budgets.   
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7) The designated responsibilities, roles and functions of oversight institutions are often 
unclear, ill-defined or broad  
Oversight capacity can be limited where responsibilities, roles and functions are broad 
and unclear. This applies particularly to Ombudsmen. Alternatively, they can be so 
specific that they exclude entire categories of behaviour and misconduct.  This is the case 
with FIUs, which are mandated with the surveillance of specified categories of  financial 
transactions.  Ombudsmen on the other hand have a much broader mandate in inviting 
complaints from members of the public about the operation of state agencies and 
statutory bodies.  This can result in complaints about any aspect of the conduct of a state 
agency (unless it is explicitly excluded), including industrial disputes in the public sector.  
Consequently oversight agencies are inundated with complaints that they do not have the 
capacity to respond to even if complainants are technically within their rights to bring 
forward a case.  For example, the Solomon Islands Ombudsman has been inundated with 
large numbers of complaints related to individual public sector employment matters, 
leading to a backlog of cases.  While complainants are within their rights to lodge 
complaints with the Ombudsman, if they are largely public service matters  they would 
more appropriately be processed within the public service.  Despite this, with recent 
institutional strengthening in the Solomon Islands Ombudsman’s office there have been 
“massive amounts of complaints that have been dealt with” (interlocutor communication 
with author).   
8) The capacities of oversight agencies are impeded by antiquated legislation  
Countries inherited legislation from colonial powers that did not adequately address 
conflict of interests, corruption, misappropriation and misuse of public funds.  All have 
laws that address certain categories of corruption, for example bribery (Larmour and 
Barcham, 2004: 18). However, these have not always been updated or amended to reflect 
changing national and international standards of best practice of government and 
administration.  For example, in the Solomon Islands many of the definitions of corrupt 
behaviour date back to British colonial rule and have not changed since 1978 and even 
before then.  These dated definitions of corruption have been cited as a reason for the 
lack of follow-up by the police and Public Prosecutor.  Because of these dated categories 
of law, they are inadequate to launch prosecutions based on the findings of Auditors 
General and Ombudsmen.  Fiji does not have a contemporary theft act.  In Fiji, 
“embezzlement of office”, is part of the same suite of legislation dealing with “larceny of 
fish”, “larceny of fruit” and “larceny by stealing a fence”.  Contemporaneously, rules and 
regulations covering the conduct of MPs, particularly conflicts of interest, can be vague.  
For example, there are no laws regulating an MP practicing law in a private capacity at 
the same time as sitting in Parliament.  Similarly it was reported by interlocutors that 
regulations governing public procurement do not adequately address nepotism or 
favouritism.  There are some controls, but they tend to reflect past practices rather than 
best international standards of present practice.  The presence of antiquated legislation 
can limit the scope of oversight capacity and contribute to poor interagency linkages 
within the law and justice sector. 
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9) Leadership codes or codes of conduct for leaders have been developed as a way of 
addressing shortfalls in legislation  
In four states – PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji – leadership code provisions are 
incorporated into national constitutions.  PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have 
enacted legislation giving effect to these constitutional provisions.  This is useful because 
it provides for a complementary suite of legislation specifically designed to deal with the 
conduct of leaders and public officials.  The time consuming and resource intensive task 
of systematically reviewing, amending, repealing and/or replacing dated legislation is not 
necessarily required if this can be covered by a comprehensive leadership code.  The role 
of the Ombudsman in leadership codes varies.  For example in PNG, Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu the Ombudsman oversees leadership codes.  In Fiji, where there has been no 
enabling legislation passed to give effect to the constitutional provision for a code of 
conduct for leaders, there is no such role for the Ombudsman who is prohibited from 
investigating the conduct of specified categories of leaders (namely ministers).  Other 
countries in the Pacific are currently considering introducing leadership codes that are 
likely to be overseen by Ombudsman offices.   
10) Regional support bodies are being encouraged to enhance and institutionally 
strengthen the capacities of national oversight agencies  
In April 2004 the leaders of the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum issued a 
declaration at their annual meeting in Auckland to improve the “quality of governance” 
by exploring the potential of regionalism (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005: 3).    
Regional support bodies could enhance and institutionally strengthen the capacities of 
national oversight agencies.  There are currently moves, as part of the Pacific Plan 
developed by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, to investigate the regionalisation of a 
number of oversight agencies such as Ombudsmen and Auditors General and 
encouraging harmonising FTR/FIU procedures and practices.   
This would not replace national oversight agencies but would rather offer regional 
ombudsmen, auditing and financial intelligence services that would enhance and 
complement national institutions.  Individual countries would retain ownership over these 
institutions but could draw on regional support if and when required.  This would be of 
particular value to smaller member states where economies of scale limit the capacities of 
their own oversight institutions.  Kiribati and Tuvalu for example, do not have an 
Ombudsman.  The availability of a regional body offering ombudsmen services would 
assist such countries in managing national oversight.  The establishment of regional 
oversight organisations/services does not imply any limitation on national sovereignty 
(Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005: 3).   
Countries could also explore regionalising services using bilateral instruments.  They 
could share institutions that would oversee their respective machineries of government.  
For example, Nauru and Kiribati have recently agreed to share the office of Chief Justice.  
While the Chief Justice exercises separate jurisdiction in both countries, the office is held 
by one person.  Larger countries, which have the resources to effectively fund their own 
national oversight institutions, would be free to explore other strategies.  For example, 
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while maintaining their own Auditors General and Ombudsmen they could draw on a 
regional pool of talent and expertise in these areas in specific cases.    
11) Leadership and the presence of champions for good governance within oversight 
agencies is crucial to their performance   
Champions in leadership positions have influence, legitimacy and skills in advocating on 
behalf of clients, colleagues and institutions. They can mediate the functions of their 
offices on the one hand with the constraints and opportunities they find in the 
organisations they regulate on the other. (Rosenfeld & Servo, 1990: 54, cited by Hobson, 
2001: 1). The ability of leaders within organisations to exercise effective management 
skills and act as champions for transparency is one of the key behavioural factors 
affecting oversight performance.  Their presence is crucial in achieving an optimal 
structural and behavioural balance.  Without champions of transparency and 
accountability, external assistance to oversight institutions will not  make much 
difference at all.  This relates back to the earlier discussion about the importance of 
political will.  At lot can be achieved if there is political will inside and outside of an 
organisation, even if human and physical resources are minimal.  If those resources are 
managed by an effective leader then an oversight institution’s capacities are greatly 
enhanced.   
12) Education and outreach is an important part of performance for oversight institutions   
Auditors General, Ombudsmen, Parliamentary committees and FIUs make important 
contributions in educating peoples, private corporations and public bodies about their 
rights and responsibilities, raising awareness in government and administration and in 
hearing public submissions.  Even if there are impediments to other areas of an oversight 
institution’s work, the educative role is fundamental.  In the Pacific the capacity of 
oversight institutions to engage in public education varies.  Interlocutors have reported 
that there is a general lack of awareness of oversight work outside of the main urban 
areas and even within Pacific towns and cities.  Ombudsmen were reported to have 
particularly low profiles in rural areas and people were unaware of their rights to levy 
complaints with Ombudsmen.  One interlocutor reported that “I’m not really sure 
whether most people in Fiji actually know of the Ombudsman’s existence or not” 
(interlocutor communication with author).  This resonates with published reports.  In 
Tonga for example, the Ombudsman is referred to as the “Commissioner for Public 
Relations”.  Transparency International’s review of National Integrity Systems in Tonga 
found that: 
Few people use the office.  There were only 16 cases in the year 2001-02.  Not 
enough people know about the office or have sufficient trust in going forward 
with complaints to use it (James & Tufui, 2004: 43).   
This contrasts with countries where ombudsmen are involved in active public education 
initiatives.   The success of the Vanuatu Ombudsman in the mid 1990s was largely due to 
the widespread publicity that the office’s reports raised in the country.  Even if they were 
not acted upon, it had the effect of increasing public knowledge about accountability, 
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transparency and appropriate leadership conduct.  Even though the new Ombudsman’s 
act in Vanuatu has reduced its powers, the office continues to maintain an active public 
education and awareness raising program.  In the Solomon Islands the Ombudsman has 
recently conducted a number of workshops in rural areas that have raised its profile.  
FIUs in the region have been working with the private sector (most notably banks) to 
increase awareness among businesses, cash dealers and members of the public of the 
importance of monitoring and reporting suspicious financial transactions.  Even where 
oversight agencies may “lack teeth” to have their recommendations followed through, or 
if their work is constrained by an unfavourable political climate, they can make efforts at 
informing the public of their role, responsibilities and capacities.   
13) Oversight institutions perform most effectively when there is public demand for good 
governance and state accountability   
All interlocutors for this study reported that oversight institutions can only perform 
effectively when there is public demand for good governance.  Without a culture that 
demands good governance and accountability from leaders, officials, governments and 
administrations, the performance of oversight agencies is limited.  The building of 
demand for good governance requires “testing” and “calibrating” the levers that society 
has available to it.  It is a long-term goal, requiring generational shifts in attitudes, values 
and norms that are complementary with customary society, not adversarial to it.  The 
exact ways of achieving these goals are complex.  It involves strengthening the media 
and the machinery of civil society. Civil society, the media and play an important part in 
building demand for good governance and maintaining expectations of accountability.  
Most Pacific states are active and vibrant democracies (and where there are constraints to 
full democracy, there are active and flourishing democratic movements within civil 
society).  This provides an important environment in which demand for good governance 
and accountability can be fostered.  This in turn would strengthen the institutional 
capacities of oversight institutions from the ground upwards, rather than depending on 
solutions devised from above.   
Building responsive regulation in the Pacific  
The findings from this research suggest specific ways that oversight agencies in the 
Pacific could be institutionally strengthened to enhance capacity building.  This needs to 
begin by building demand for good governance in the Pacific.  One way that demand for 
good governance could be encouraged could be through adopting principles of responsive 
regulation.  Responsive regulation emphasises voluntary compliance through persuasion, 
education and cooperation, rather than sanctions and enforcement (Ayres & Braithwaite 
1992:4-5).  It takes into account the motivations, problems and conditions of the 
regulated.  Assistance and capacity building are promoted.  Threats are de-emphasised.  
However, sanctions are available and imposable, escalating in ever increasing intensity 
with recalcitrant non-compliance (Job & Honaker 1992:113).  Responsive regulation is 
flexible, dynamic and culturally accountable.  The behaviour of institutions (such as 
government and administration) can be regulated through oversight agencies having a 
cooperative, persuasive and educative role that invokes best practice international and 
national standards, norms and values. Regulatory functions are delegated to different 
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actors within the model of a ‘regulatory pyramid’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) (see Fig. 
1 and Fig. 2). 
 
Regulation should be focused at the broadest base of the regulatory pyramid invoking 
self-regulation, moral suasion and education.  However, regulators should have 
enforcement capacities available that allow them to escalate sanctions up the regulatory 
pyramid to its apex where their recommendations can be upheld and enforced.  
In the Pacific there are already oversight institutions in which principles of responsive 
regulation are evident.  The practices of the PNG Ombudsman’s Commission invoke 
widespread appeals to moral persuasion and cooperation with the agencies and 
individuals that it regulates, especially under the leadership code.  Rather than not 
operating to the full extent of its capacities and powers, the Commission could instead be 
viewed as functioning at the broadest based of the regulatory pyramid.   The 
Ombudsman’s Commission does have powers to escalate sanctions up the enforcement 
pyramid in cases of wilful non-compliance and clear breaches of the leadership code.  It 
even has prosecutorial powers (to dismiss MPs for example) in the last instance, that is if 
the Public Prosecutor fails to act on its recommendations.  It escalates its enforcement 
functions through the Leadership Tribunal and tends to work closely with the Public 
Prosecutor.  Transparency International’s review of National Integrity Systems in PNG 










Command Regulation with 
nondiscretionary punishment 
Fig. 1. Example of a pyramid of enforcement strategies 
(source: Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992: 39).  
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Between 1975 and 1997, there were thirty-five politicians and public officials 
that were hauled before the leadership tribunals.  Twenty-one of these leaders 
were found guilty.  Out of this twenty-one, thirteen were dismissed from their 
office while eight were fined…The effectiveness of the code is to a large 
extent determined by the capacity of the enforcing organization (the PNGOC), 
the vigilance of the public and the ability for compliance on the part of the 
leaders themselves (Mellam & Aloi, 2003: 32, emphasis added).   
The success of the PNG’s Ombudsman’s Commission resonates with principles of 
responsive regulation.  The use of the enforcement apex peak of the regulatory pyramid is 
relatively rare, averaging less than one guilty finding per annum between 1975 and 1997.  
Most of the Commission’s work would be concentrating on managing self-regulation.  
However, the Commission does have the capacity to enforce self-regulation and punish 
non-compliant breaches of the leadership code.  It only needs to use these powers 
occasionally to reinforce the point that it can effectively oversee misconduct and enforce 
its oversight.  In the Pacific oversight agencies could be institutionally strengthened over 
time by exploring the applicability of the following model, Fig. 2 (next page):   
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Conclusion and recommendations 
Oversight institutions – Auditors General, Ombudsmen, Parliamentary committees and 
FIUs – have a vital role in ensuring accountability, transparency and probity in the 
overall machinery of government and administration.  In the Pacific the performance of 
oversight institutions is characterised by variation at the administrative, constitutional, 
political and legal levels.  This in turn explains common trends and themes that 
distinguish oversight agencies on the basis of their relative performance.  Where 
oversight institutions have support and political will, are free from external interference, 
have independent controls over their own budgets, are adequately resourced and have 
effective relationships with enforcement branches within the law and justice sector, they 
perform well.  In the Pacific some oversight institutions have these high levels of 
performance, while others find it wanting, both within and between countries. 
Oversight agencies lend themselves well to institutional strengthening and capacity 
building.  Adopting principle-based measures that invoke responsive regulation offer one 
of the most compelling ways of institutionally strengthening oversight agencies.  This 
approach favours the application of broad principles rather than hard and fast rules and 
regulations.  This model of flexibility, cooperation and education may offer the best 
opportunities for improving both the capacity and quality of oversight institutions and 
building the demand for good governance and accountability that is so vital for their long 
term success. 
The development of a model of responsible regulation as indicated in Fig.2 could 
provide general guidelines on how national governments and donors can allocate 
resources, focus priorities and calibrate enforcement capacities over time.  The emphasis 
on education and cooperation suggests that oversight agencies should concentrate their 
energies at the broadest base of the regulatory pyramid as a means of helping build 
demand for good governance at a community level.  The overall effectiveness of 
responsive regulatory principles could be enhanced by donors, national governments and 
regional organisations considering the following policy steps:  
? Oversight institutions require financial independence to limit the extent of external 
interference.  Efforts should be made to establish independent budget lines.  Budgets 
could be set by independent bipartisan parliamentary committees.   
? The placement of expatriate in-line staff at senior levels within oversight institutions 
should only be done cautiously.  Where in-line advisers are placed within oversight 
institutions their tasks should include mentoring, training and education as well as 
discharging designated duties.   
? High calibre leadership within oversight institutions is crucial.  Champions of good 
governance should be fostered and promoted within oversight institutions.  Good 
leadership contributes to high levels of staff morale, efficaciousness, efficiency, 
productivity and performance.   
? The roles and duties of oversight institutions need to be clarified.  This may require 
administrative reorganisation.  In some countries such as PNG and Vanuatu, the 
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ombudsman oversees leadership codes giving the office a clear and well defined 
focus.  This needs to be encouraged.   
? The relationship between oversight and enforcement could be strengthened by 
increased strategic funding and resourcing.  For example, financial investigative 
powers of police could be enhanced by recruiting additional police officers with audit 
and accounting experience and skills.  Some countries may wish to establish 
specialised serious fraud squads with prosecutorial powers.  Countries are already 
able to call upon expertise from Australian and New Zealand law enforcement 
agencies in specific cases where there is a skills/resources shortage.  This should be 
encouraged.   
? Common law systems and administrative practices tend to make clear demarcations 
between investigative functions of oversight agencies and the prosecutorial powers of 
the enforcement branches within the law and justice sector.  This distinction is not a 
universal practice however.  In some countries, particularly civil law jurisdictions, 
oversight institutions such as ombudsmen and even FIUs have prosecutorial powers.  
This could be an option to consider for Pacific Island States where the relationship 
between oversight and enforcement is weak.   
? Through regulating official behaviour, oversight agencies can perform a vital role in 
preventing and reducing corruption within governments and administrations.  There 
are international standards of best practice that provide important benchmarks for 
countries to work towards.  This includes the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNODC).  Of the 16 Pacific Island Forum member states, Australia, 
New Zealand and Papua New Guinea have signed this convention.  The position of 
oversight agencies maybe strengthened if other member states sign this convention.   
? Regionalisation of oversight services offers economies of scale in delivery.  This can 
be achieved without comprising national sovereignty.  Countries could supplement 
their own oversight agencies by referring to a regional authority when it is required.  
Alternatively they could delegate oversight capacities directly to regional bodies.  
This would be particularly useful for small micro states which do not necessarily have 
the resources available to maintain offices of Ombudsmen and Auditors General.  
Regionalisation, as formulated in the Pacific plan, should be encouraged.   
? Building demand for good governance with the public is a long term goal.  National 
governments and donors can foster this by supporting, encouraging and facilitating 
dialogue with representatives of civil society, the media and NGOs.  A free and open 
media and an active NGO sector is crucial for building demand for good governance 
at a local level and these efforts should be encouraged both nationally and 
internationally.  
? Financial management is important for effective oversight agency performance and 
needs to be strengthened.  Assistance is currently provided through regional 
organisations such as the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre (PFTAC).  
These support mechanisms and institutions should continue to receive priority.     
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